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We study oligopolistic rmsincentives to share customer information about past pur-
chase history in a situation where rms are uncertain about whether a particular con-
sumer considers the product o¤erings complements or substitutes. By addressing this
new type of behavior-based price discrimination, we show that both the incentive to
share customer information and its e¤ects on consumers depend crucially on the relative
magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary and substitute mar-
kets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences. This paper has
important implications for merger analysis when the primary motive for merger is the
acquisition of another 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nd that the informational regime
in which 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1 Introduction
In this paper we study oligopolistic rmsincentives to share customer information about
past purchase history. More specically, we consider a situation in which the relationship
(i.e., the degree of substitutability or complementarity) between the product o¤erings by
oligopolistic rms is customer-specic, private information unknown to the rms. Goods are
substitutes for some customers and complements for others. The air travel and rental car
services, for instance, can be complements for some travelers who use both modes of trans-
portation in the same trip. However, they can be substitutes for others, especially short-
to medium-distance travelers.1 Another example is the relationship between printed ver-
sions of novels and motion picture adaptations. For some consumers they can be competing
products whereas for other consumers they can be complements.2
The sharing of customer-specic transaction records allows the rms to update infor-
mation about a particular consumers preference towards the products. In such a setup,
we analyze the rms incentives to share customer information, and the impact of such
sharing on market competition. These questions are especially relevant in electronic com-
merce, where consumersrecords of previous purchases can be easily traced and stored by
electronic "ngerprints."3 Our study also has important implications for merger analysis
when the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another rms customer lists.
We consider a simple two-period model to address the issues related to inter-rm infor-
mation sharing. Each rm collects information about its own sales record. As a result, at
the end of the rst period, each rm acquires information concerning whether or not a par-
ticular individual has bought a unit of its own product through its rst-period marketing.
In the absence of information sharing, however, each rm remains uncertain over whether
the customer has also bought a unit of the other rms product. In contrast, with infor-
mation sharing each rm can learn the complete history of the past transaction record of a
1More people rent a car and drive to their destinations as airport security inspections have become more
of a hassle following the 9/11 terrorist attack.
2Motion picture versions were initially thought to be competing against printed versions when they were
rst introduced. However, lm adaptations and printed novels are widely perceived to be complements now.
See Gentzkow (2007) for more examples.
3E-commerce activities have rapidly grown and play an increasingly important role for the U.S. economy.
According to the most recent data from the Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce, total e-
commerce sales for 2006 were estimated at $108.7 billion, accounting for 2.8 percent of total sales in 2006.
The gure for e-commerce sales is an increase of 23.5 percent from 2005. In contrast, total retail sales in
2006 increased only 5.8 percent from 2005.
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specic consumer. The aggregation of customer lists allows the rms to infer whether that
customer considers the goods substitutes or complements. We analyze how this customer-
specic information concerning the relationship of the two products can be used as a basis
for price discrimination in the second period.
The analysis of the e¤ects of information sharing on market competition and each rms
incentives to share information with other rms is complicated because the other rms,
with whom the customer information might be shared, could be potential rivals in the
substitute market and at the same time partners in the complementary market, depending
on consumer types. We show that the incentive to share customer information depends
crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complement and
substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences for the
two products. The intuition for this result is as follows.
With information sharing, the rms can distinguish consumers who consider the two
products complementary from those who consider them substitutes. As a result, they
charge di¤erent prices depending on consumer types. For consumers who consider the two
products complementary, the two rms tend to set too high prices with information sharing
from the viewpoint of joint prot maximization. This is due to the Cournot e¤ect in the
complementary monopoly problem. The two rms could have obtained a higher prot by
cooperatively lowering their individual prices as if they were a merged monopolist. This
ine¢ ciency in a noncooperative equilibrium occurs because the two rms do not internalize
the interdependence of their pricing strategies. In contrast, for consumers who consider the
two products substitutes, the two rms charge too little with information sharing from the
perspectives of joint prot maximization due to competition. Without information sharing,
each rm who maximizes its expected prot must post a single price which is the (weighted)
average of the prices that would have prevailed under information sharing. Suppose that the
price for consumers who regard the products as substitutes is lower than that for consumers
who consider them complementary under information sharing. Then, the average price
mitigates the externality problem in the complementary markets. In addition, the average
pricing relaxes competition in the substitute market enabling the rms to extract more
rents. On both accounts, the rms are better o¤ without information sharing. Of course,
if we consider the other case where the full information price in the substitute market is
higher than that in the complementary market, information sharing leads to a higher prot
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in the opposite manner.
The e¤ect of information sharing on consumers also di¤ers across consumer types, and
depend crucially on the relative magnitudes of full information prices that would prevail in
the complementary and substitute markets. For instance, when the full information price
in the substitute market is higher than that in the complementary market, information
sharing benets consumers who regard the two products as complements, but hurts those
who regard them as substitutes. The impact on consumers is reversed if the full information
price in the substitute market is lower than that in the complementary market.
The intuition for our main result also provides a new perspective on the determinants
of the degree of product di¤erentiation. Firms potentially face a trade-o¤ between a higher
prot associated with highly di¤erentiated goods in the substitute market and the po-
tentially aggravated externality problem in the complementary market when information
sharing is banned and the rms are forced to charge one price. This implies that the infor-
mational regime in which rms reside can inuence the choice of product di¤erentiation.
Our basic model analyzes direct exchange of customer information between the rms in
the market. Our analysis, however, also has implications for other channels of information
aggregation. For instance, our analysis suggests a new role of middlemen the intermedi-
aries between the seller of a good and its potential buyers as information aggregators. If
the direct exchange of customer information between rms is banned due to either privacy
concerns or antitrust reasons, the presence of middlemen such as Amazon, eBay, or Google
check-out can benet rms and some consumers by functioning as lawful institutions that
facilitate information aggregation. To the best of our knowledge, this role of middlemen
has not yet been addressed.4
In addition, our model provides a new rationale for merger in which the primary motive
for merger is the acquisition of another rms customer lists rather than its real assets.5 Even
if a merger does not lead to greater market-power or cost-synergies such as the elimination
of duplicative production and marketing expenses, it still can be a protable strategy due to
the value of customer lists held by its merger partner. The recent acquisition of CDNow by
4See Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) and Yavas (1994) for an analysis of middlemen as an intermediary
to reduce transaction costs in bilateral search economies with trade frictions.
5Customer information is one of the intangible assets acquired through a merger, according to Antitrust
Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (October 2004)by the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust
Division (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm). However, there is no formal analysis
that recognizes the customer list as a primary driver of merger.
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Bertelsmann is a case in point. CDNow, a web-based startup company founded in February
1994, publicly announced that its cash assets were only su¢ cient to sustain another six
months of operations in March 2000. Its major asset was its customer list of 3.29 million
people in June 2000; it did not have substantial physical assets like other online retailers.
In July 2000, however, Bertelsmann acquired CDNow for $117 million in an all-cash deal
appreciating the value of CDNows customer base.6 Our study can o¤er a theoretical
foundation for the M&A of a rm whose only asset is its customer lists in the context of
behavior-based price discrimination.7
Our paper is related to two strands of literature: information sharing and behavior-
based price discrimination. There is by now an extensive literature that studies the issue of
information sharing between oligopolistic rms concerning market demand and production
cost. For example, Clarke (1983), Crawford and Sobel (1982), Gal-Or (1984, 1985), and
Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) address the incentives to share private information about
uncertain market demand that is common to every rm. Fried (1984), Shapiro (1986) and
Armantier and Richard (2003) analyze incentives to exchange information about private cost
that is idiosyncratic to each rm.8 Our paper, in contrast, considers the sharing of customer-
specic transaction records and its implications for dynamic price discrimination.9
As in our paper, the literature on behavior-based price discrimination considers how the
information gleaned from past sales record can reveal customer-specic preferences, which
can be used as a basis to practice personalized pricing, and its impact on market outcomes
such as consumer- and producer surplus.10 Acquisti and Varian (2005) consider a setting in
which rational consumers with constant valuations for the goods purchase from a monopoly
merchant who can commit to a pricing policy. They show that although it is feasible to
price so as to distinguish high-value and low-value consumers from advances in information
6See Gupta and Lehmann (2003) for more details about CDNow case and the value of customers.
7See Banal-Estanol (2007) for an analysis of horizontal mergers that explicitly takes into account the
sharing of private information of merging parties. However, the nature of private information is about
uncertain demands or costs as in the existing information sharing literature.
8There have also been studies on the incentives to share credit information among nancial intermediaries.
Bouckaert and Degryse (2005) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2001), for instance, analyze the issue of credit
information sharing in the context of entry-deterrence or as a collusive device.
9See Liu and Serfes (2006) for several real practices of companies who participate in the selling and
trading of customer information.
10For an excellent survey of the literature on behavior-based price discrimination, see Fudenberg and
Villas-Boas (forthcoming).
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technology, the merchant will never nd it optimal to do so, echoing the results from the
prior literature on dynamic price discrimination.11 They then extend their model to allow
the seller to o¤er enhanced services to previous customers and nd that conditioning prices
on purchase history can be protable.12 Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), and
Taylor (2003), in contrast, consider a duopolistic setting with competition to analyze the
implications of price discrimination based on purchase history. Unlike previous works on
behavior-based price discrimination, our innovation in this paper is to allow the possibility
that product o¤erings can be either substitutes or complements. The existing literature
typically assumes that the relationship between products is one of the two types, and that
this relationship is known to the rms that make strategic choices. One notable exception
is Gentzkow (2007) who explicitly analyzes the possibility that product o¤erings can be
either substitutes or complements as in our paper. Even though our paper and Gentzkows
share the same basic premise, the focus of his paper is very di¤erent from ours. He is
mainly concerned with developing a new econometric technique to estimate the impact of
new goods that accounts for the possibility that the new goods can be complements to the
existing goods.
Liu and Serfes (2006) is closest to our paper in that it also takes a step in the direction
of examining the rmsincentives to share their customer-specic information with other
rms. They consider a Hotelling model in which each rm can collect detailed customer
information about their own customers, indexed by a precise location in the Hotelling
model. With information sharing, rms can practice perfect price discrimination against
not only their own previous customers, but also the consumers who bought from rival rms.
However, there is one key di¤erence in the main qualitative results. In Liu and Serfes,
neither rm nds it protable to share information when rms have equal customer bases.
The incentive to share information arises only when there is enough asymmetry in their
market shares. In such a case, the sharing of information takes the form of a one-way
transaction in which the rm with the smaller customer base sells its information to the
rm with the larger customer base while the "big" rm never has incentives to sell its
information to the smaller rival rm. In our model, however, the information sharing takes
place between symmetrically positioned rms. In addition, the relationship between the two
11This is due to strategic demand reduction by sophisticated consumers. See Stokey (1979).
12For the related issue of consumer privacy, see Taylor (2004) and Calzolari and Pavan (2005).
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rms is always competitive and the pooling of information does not reveal any information
about the relationship (complements or substitutes) between the two products in Liu and
Serfes (2006), whereas the revelation of this relationship is a key aspect in our framework.
Liu and Serfes and our paper complement each other in that we explore the incentives to
share information in the rmsquest for qualitative improvement of information, while they
study the same issue from the rmsstrategic incentives to enlarge the information base.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
In section 3, we derive the market equilibrium in the presence of information sharing and
analyze how information sharing can be used as a basis for behavior-based price discrimi-
nation. Section 4 analyzes the market equilibrium in the absence of information sharing. In
section 5, we analyze incentives to share information and the impact of information sharing
on consumer welfare. In section 6, we discuss a couple of interesting implications that can
be drawn from our simple framework and check the robustness of our main results. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Consider two goods, A and B; respectively produced by rm A and rm B, that consumers
may regard either as complements or as substitutes depending on their preferences. For
simplicity and analytical tractability, we consider only two distinct groups of consumers: one
group of consumers in proportion , called group C, regard the two goods as complements
and the other group of consumers in proportion (1   ), called group S, consider them
substitutes.13 The proportion  is common knowledge, where  2 (0; 1).
The model is a two-period setting in which each consumer purchases at most one unit
of each good per period. Each rm is able to keep track of individual transaction records
of its customers. In particular, this assumption implies that at the end of the rst period,
each rm knows whether or not a particular consumer has bought a unit of its own good
13Alternatively, it would be interesting to consider a downward sloping demand with the complementarity
(or substitutability) embodied as a continuous variable. In this spirit, let us suppose an individual consumer
has a downward-sloping demand for good i , for instance, which is given as Di(pi; pj ;) = a   pi + pj ,
where the coe¢ cient  measures its complementarity or substitutability:  > 0 is for substitutes,  < 0 is
for complements, and  = 0 is for independent goods. If consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
complementarities that are correlated over time, then the exchange of past purchase histories may provide
the rms with a better estimate for the value of the parameter ; relative to the case where rms do not
share their customer information. We believe that our main intuition of this paper can work; the full analysis
through this alternative framework is beyond the scope of this paper.
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in the rst period. This information allows each rm to engage in behavior-based price
discrimination in the second period, that is, charging di¤erent prices to consumers with
di¤erent purchase histories.
Let us denote a consumers purchase decision by (a; b), where a and b respectively refer
to decisions concerning products A and B with 1 representing the purchase of the relevant
product and 0 representing no purchase. A consumers purchase history in the rst period
then can be described by an element of a set H = f(0; 0); (1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g: For instance,
a consumer with a purchase history (1; 0) is the one who purchased product A, but not B
in the rst period.
We consider two potential information regimes. Without any sharing of customer
information at the end of the rst period, each rms knowledge about each consumers
purchase history is limited to its own product. Each consumers past purchase history
concerning the other rms product is in the dark. With partial knowledge of customer
purchase history, each rms information set is coarser than the set of potential history
H. We denote rm As information set concerning a particular consumer by eIA = f(0; ),
(1; )g, where  stands for non-availability of information.14 Similarly, rm Bs information
set can be represented by eIB = f(; 0), (; 1)g. If the two rms exchange customer lists at the
end of the rst period, both rms know the complete history of each consumers purchase.
In this case, the information set of both rms concerning each consumer is the same as the set
of potential history for each consumer, that is, IA = IB = H = f(0; 0); (1; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g.
Within each group of consumers (C or S), we assume heterogeneity of preferences.
More specically, a consumer of type  in group C has the following net surpluses from
each possible choices in each period.
uC(pA; pB; ) =
8>>><>>>:
   pA   pB
 pi
0
if both A and B are purchased
if only good i is purchased
if neither one is purchased
(1)
where pi denotes rm is price for i = A; B and the superscript C indicates that the
consumer belongs to group C. The type parameter  represents the consumers reservation
value for the pair of products viewed as complementary. We assume that  is distributed
14Variables associated with the regime of no information sharing are denoted with a tilde.
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over an interval [; ] with distribution and density functions of F () and f(), respectively,
where 0    : The consumer in group C does not derive any benet from consuming
only one good, thus earning the utility of  pi when only one good is purchased. The utility
from buying neither A nor B is normalized to zero.
On the other hand, the consumers in group S are heterogeneous with respect to their
relative preferences for B over A: We capture this consumer heterogeneity with the para-
meter . More precisely, we assume that consumer type s reservation values for goods
A and B are given by vA = v   2 and vB = v + 2 , respectively. That is, vB = vA + 
for  2 [; ] with a positive value of  indicating that the consumer prefers good B to
good A.15 Let G() and g() denote the distribution and the density of ; respectively. For
simplicity, we also assume that G is symmetric about zero, with  =   > 0. A consumer
in group S has the following surplus from each possible choice.
uS(pA; pB; ) =
8>>><>>>:
maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB
vi   pi
0
if
if both A and B are purchased
if only good i is purchased
if neither one is purchased
(2)
where the superscript S indicates that the consumer belongs to group S. The consumer in
group S; who regards the two goods as substitutes, earns a net surplus of maxfvA; vBg  
pA   pB from buying both A and B; the utility of buying only good i is set to be vi   pi:
We assume that v is high enough to ensure that each consumer in this group buys at least
one unit of either A or B.16 The utility from no purchase is set to zero.
Both rms have the same constant unit-cost of production, d: Finally, F and G satisfy
the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition: f()=[1 F ()] and g()=[1 G()] are strictly
increasing in  and , respectively,17 which ensures the rst-order condition for optimization
to be su¢ cient for the second-order condition.
Finally, we assume that a consumer belongs to the same group over the two periods; that
15The same framework for the horizontal product di¤erentiation is used in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
16This model specication is somewhat restrictive in that we do not allow the consumers in group S to
opt for no purchase. The qualitative results of this paper, however, are robust to the relaxation of this
assumption, which will be discussed in section 6.
17Roughly speaking, this condition means that the density functions f and g do not grow too fast, which is
satised with most of the well-known distribution functions, including the uniform, exponential, and normal
distributions.
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is, the group characteristics are a xed trait. However, we assume that parameters  and
 are independently drawn from their distributions in each period. This allows us to isolate
the strategic incentives to share information concerning consumerspreferences towards the
products without being concerned with the issue of customer poaching and/or personalized
pricing within the same group, which has been extensively studied in the literature [see
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003, 2004), and Acquisti and Varian (2005)]. In
fact, our focus in this paper is on the ex post incentive to share information and we abstract
from strategic demand manipulation by consumers in the rst period to elicit a better price
in the second period. We will discuss conditions under which consumers behave myopically
in section 6. This implies that rms can identify the group identity of each consumer if
they exchange customer information at the end of the rst period.
3 Sharing of Customer Information
If rms exchange their customer lists acquired through the rst-period marketing, they are
able to draw inferences about customerspreferences towards the two products. This implies
that they are able to charge di¤erent prices in the second period, depending on whether
consumers consider the two products substitutes or complements. Consequently, the two
groups of consumers are segmented and each rm plays noncooperative pricing games in
two separate markets.
3.1 The market for group C consumers
We rst consider the consumers who consider the two goods complementary. It is a
standard result that the two rms setting prices independently charge too much overall
from the collective viewpoint of the rms. This is due to the externality problem, noted
by Cournot (1838), with two distinct rms acting independently as a monopolist of each
complementary good. The two rms could have obtained a higher prot if they had
cooperatively lowered their individual prices as if they were a merged monopolist. This
ine¢ ciency arises because the independent rms do not internalize the interdependence of
their pricing strategies, whereas the merged rm does.18 Consumer surplus also increases
18This problem occurs as a dual form in the standard Cournot quantity-setting with substitutes, which
Sonnenschein (1968) noted.
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with a merged monopolist due to a lowered total price for the goods.19
Let us briey show that this classic result applies to the market for group C consumers.20
The optimal decision for consumers in group C can be characterized by a simple cut-o¤ rule:8<: Buy both A and BBuy neither A nor B if   

 < 
(3)
where   pC
A
+ pC
B
denotes the threshold consumer who is indi¤erent between the two
choices. Those with    buy both goods since their willingness to pay for a pair of
complements is greater than or equal to the total price for the two goods, while those
with  <  buy neither due to a relatively low reservation value for consuming the two
complementary goods. The demand for each good is thus given by 1   F (). Firm is
prot maximization problem can be written as
Max
pCi
Ci = (p
C
i   d)

1  F (pCi + pCj )

: (4)
The rst-order condition with respect to each rms full information price, pCi ; yields

1  F (pCi + pCj )
  (pCi   d)f(pCi + pCj ) = 0 (5)
for i = A;B and i 6= j: The two rst-order conditions implicitly dene each rms best-
response function whose slope, dpi=dpj (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j); is negative and its absolute value
is less than one.21 This implies that two responses meet each other at most once where we
nd a unique, stable, symmetric Nash equilibrium that is implicitly dened by
pC = d+
1  F (2pC)
f(2pC)
: (6)
On the other hand, an integrated monopolist would have solved the following prot
19Clearly, this case is still not the rst-best outcome: the price with the integrated monopolist is still
above the total marginal cost.
20 In a similar vein, an integrated upstream licensor holding patents for several complementary technologies
can charge a cheaper total price compared to the case of separate patent holders for each innovation. This
suggests a welfare-enhancing role for patent pools in case of complementary technologies. See Lerner and
Tirole (2004) for a formal discussion of this issue.
21The total di¤erentiation to (5) shows dpi=dpj =  

1 + 1 F
f2
f 0

=

2 + 1 F
f2
f 0

>  1 due to the fact
that 1  f 0F=f2  0 from the MHR condition.
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maximization problem
Max
Pm
m = (Pm   2d)[1  F (Pm)] (7)
where Pm denotes the total price for a pair of the two goods under monopoly. The rst-order
condition for this problem yields
[1  F (Pm)]  (Pm   2d)f(Pm) = 0: (8)
and thus
Pm = 2d+
1  F (Pm)
f(Pm)
: (9)
By comparing (5) and (8), we nd that the left-hand-side of (8) evaluated at the price of
Pm = 2pC becomes negative, which implies that the integrated monopolist charges less than
the sum of prices independent rms would charge in duopoly, and that the prot associated
with the monopoly case is larger than the sum of two rmsprots under duopoly.22 Figure
1 shows the relationship of pC and pm(= Pm=2) graphically.
Figure 1. The externality problem in the complementary market
22Assuming a uniform distribution of  on [0; 1] and d = 0, the joint-prot maximizing price for a pair of
complements is equal to 1
2
; and thus one rm is required to charge the price of 1
4
and receives a prot of 1
8
.
However, with two rms competing non-cooperatively, the equilibrium price that each rm charges is 1
3
and
each ones prot becomes 1
9
:
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3.2 The market for group S consumers
A consumer who regards the two goods as substitutes buys a unit of either A or B.23 The
consumer will compare the net surplus of each choice and choose the good that yields a
higher surplus. The optimal decision rule is given by8<: choose A over Bchoose B over A if vA   p
S
A  vB   pSB
vA   pSA < vB   pSB
,   

 > 
(10)
where   pSB   pSA:24 Since the demand for rm A is G(); the optimization problem for
rm A in the market of substitutes is given by
Max
pSA
SA = (p
S
A   d)G(pSB   pSA): (11)
The rst-order condition for this problem yields
@SA=@p
S
A = G(p
S
B   pSA)  (pSA   d)g(pSB   pSA) = 0: (12)
A marginal increase in the price of good A leads to an increase in the mark-up for the
inframarginal consumers of good A; which is represented by the rst term G(pSB   pSA):
However, rm A loses some consumers at the margin to rm B because of the marginal
increase in pSA; which is captured by the second term,  (pSA   d)g(pSB   pSA). The best-
response of pA to a given pB describes rm As optimal price with this trade-o¤ considered.
In a similar manner, we can derive the best-response function of rm B:
The equilibrium price is uniquely determined because the best responses have positive
slopes that are less than one.25 The symmetric equilibrium price of pSA = p
S
A = p
S is given
by
pS = d+
1
2g(0)
: (13)
The mark-up in the market of substitutes is represented by 1=2g(0). Given the assump-
tion that  is distributed symmetrically around zero, a larger value of g(0) indicates that
23 In Appendix A, we show this claim rigorously.
24This tie-breaking rule is inconsequential because here we consider a continuum of consumers so that the
point mass of critical consumers is zero.
25Similarly to the case of complements, the application of the implicit function theorem to the rst order
condition yields dpA
dpB
= 1 Gg
0=g2
2 Gg0=g2 > 0 and
dpA
dpB
< 1 because the MHR condition implies 1 G  g0=g2  0:
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consumerspreferences are more concentrated around zero and that they have less diverse
preferences for the goods. We can thus interpret the reciprocal of 2g(0) as the degree of
heterogeneity in consumersrelative preferences towards the two substitute products, which
plays a role similar to the transportation cost (or product di¤erentiation) parameter in the
standard Hotelling model.
The following lemma summarizes and compares the two equilibrium prices for each
group, pC and pS :
Lemma 1 When each consumers group identity (C or S) is revealed to the two rms via
information sharing, the full-information price for consumers in group C is characterized
by pC = d + [1   F (2pC)]=f(2pC) and the full-information price for consumers in group S
is given by pS = d + 12g(0) : Therefore, the relative magnitudes of these two prices depend
on the distributions F and G: In particular, if the two goods are perceived to be highly
di¤erentiated for group S consumers (i.e., g(0) is low), pS will be higher than pC with all
other things being equal.
Let C and S denote the equilibrium prots in markets for consumer groups C and
S, respectively. That is, C = (pC   d)(1   F (2pC)) and S = 1=4g(0): With information
sharing, each rms second-period total prot from both markets is given by
2 = C + (1  )S : (14)
4 No Sharing of Customer Information
4.1 Bayesian updating about group identity
If rms do not exchange their customer lists, each rm only knows whether a particular
consumer is a newcomer or a returning customer. However, each rm is unaware of whether
a consumer has bought from the other rm or not. When a consumer is a newcomer 
not in its customer list at the beginning of the second-period the seller can think of two
possibilities: the consumer actually considered the two goods complementary but did not
buy either good because of a relatively low willingness to pay for a pair of goods, or the
consumer regarded the goods as substitutes and bought a good from the other rm in the
previous period. In a similar manner, facing a returning consumer already registered in its
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present customer list, the seller also can think of two possibilities: the consumer considered
the goods complements and bought both goods, or the consumer considered the two goods
substitutes and chose its own product over the rivals.
Each rm will update its prior beliefs about the group identity of a particular consumer,
based on his/her past purchase history. Following a Bayesian updating process, the posterior
beliefs of rm A can be derived as follows.
0A  Pr[Cj(0; )] =
F (^)
F (^) + (1  )(1 G(^))
1A  Pr[Cj(1; )] =
(1  F (^))
(1  F (^)) + (1  )G(^) ; (15)
where 0A and 
1
A respectively denote rm As conditional probability that a newcomer
and a returning consumer would belong to group C, and ^ and ^ denote the rst-period
thresholds for critical consumers, which depend on the rst period prices charged by rms
A and B. Similarly, rm Bs posteriors are given as
0B  Pr[Cj(; 0)] =
F (^)
F (^) + (1  )G(^)
1B  Pr[Cj(; 1)] =
(1  F (^))
(1  F (^)) + (1  )(1 G(^)) ; (16)
where 0B and 
1
B denote rm Bs posteriors that a newcomer and a returning consumer
would consider the two goods complementary.
Then, obviously, the posteriors 0i and 
1
i typically di¤er from the prior ; unless  is
either 1 or 0; for i = A; B: In other words, if a consumers substitutability or comple-
mentarity between the product o¤erings by oligopolistic rms is customer-specic, private
information, rms (sellers) will have di¤erent posterior beliefs about the group identify of
a particular consumer based on the purchase history. This implies that rms may post dif-
ferent prices to the consumers depending on whether a particular consumer is a newcomer
or a returning customer, even without customer information sharing.
Proposition 1 (A new type of price discrimination) Firms who are uncertain of con-
sumers preferences (complementarity / substitutability) can practice personalized pricing
based on their customerspurchase history, regardless of the decision on information shar-
ing.
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Previous studies found that the discriminatory pricing can be based on the purchase
history in the presence of consumer heterogeneity with respect to reservation valuations
(Taylor, 2004; Acquisti and Varian, 2005), relative preferences (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000),
or switching costs (Chen, 1997; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2004). This paper enriches the
literature of behavior-based price discrimination by introducing another possible basis for
the price discrimination that, to our best knowledge, has not yet been addressed.
4.2 Price competition in the second period
Let us describe the rms second-period prot maximization problem without information
sharing. Let p0i and p
1
i denote the prices that rm i posts for a newcomer and for a returning
customer, respectively. Let us describe the rms second-period prot maximization prob-
lem without information sharing. Firm i expects a newcomer to consider the two goods
complementary with probability 0i ; and thus the newcomer will also be o¤ered the new-
comer price from rm j; for i 6= j: In contrast, rm i expects the newcomer to regard the
goods as substitutes with the remaining probability 1  0i ; and thus the newcomer will be
o¤ered the price for a returning consumer from the other rm, p1j : As a result, rm As
prot maximization problem for a newcomer is given by
Max
p0A
0A = (p
0
A   d)

0A[1  F
 
p0A + p
0
B

] + (1  0A)G
 
p1B   p0A
	
: (17)
Similarly, the optimization problem for a returning consumer reads as
Max
p1A
1A = (p
1
A   d)

1A[1  F
 
p1A + p
1
B

] + (1  1A)G
 
p0B   p1A
	
: (18)
We can easily describe rm Bs optimization problems as well. The symmetric equilib-
rium prices with no information sharing, p0 and p1; can be derived from these optimization
problems. Each rms second-period total prot from two markets without information
sharing is given by
e2A = [F (^) + (1  )(1 G(^))]0 + [(1  F (^)) + (1  )G(^)]1e2B = [F (^) + (1  )G(^)]0 + [(1  F (^)) + (1  )(1 G(^))]1 (19)
where 0 and 1 denote the expected prot per newcomer and per returning consumer in
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equilibrium, respectively.
Now we are ready to discuss the relationship between the second-period equilibrium
prices with and without information sharing. Intuitively, the prices without information
sharing, p0 and p1; will be located between the full information prices. In the presence of
uncertainty about the group identity of a consumer, each rm will post (weighted) average
prices of the two full information prices in order to maximize its expected prots. This is
similar to the result that the rms with incomplete information about demands or costs post
a weighted average price to maximize their expected prot in either Cournot or Bertrand
competition.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium prices without information sharing are between the full infor-
mation prices, i.e., minfpC ; pSg < p0; p1 < maxfpC ; pSg for any , 0    1:
(See Appendix for the proof.)
To sum up, if the rms share their customer information, they can charge two distinct
full information prices, pC and pS ; according to the group identity. Without information
sharing, the rms post two di¤erent prices p0 and p1 that are averages of the two full
information prices based on the consumers past purchase history. Therefore, customer
information sharing provides a more precise basis for the price discrimination in the second
period.
5 Incentives to Share Information and E¤ects on Consumers
In this section, we analyze the rmsincentives to share their customer information with
the other rms. One novel feature in our model is that the rms with whom the customer
information might be shared could be potential rivals in the substitutes market and at the
same time partners in the complementary markets, depending on consumer types. We also
study the e¤ect of information sharing on consumers from an antitrust perspective.
5.1 To share or not
In order to investigate the rmsincentives to share information, we need to compare overall
prots over the two periods with and without information sharing, not only because sophis-
ticated consumers who expect ex post discriminatory pricing, may strategically manipulate
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their demands, but also because the rms might adopt strategic pricing in the rst period,
even without information sharing. In this section, let us rst study ex post incentives to
share information by comparing the second-period prots only, and reserve more discussion
about strategic considerations for section 6.
In the second period, we can think of two distinct cases according to the relative mag-
nitudes of full information prices, pC and pS .26 Let us rst consider the case in which the
full information price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods,
i.e., pS < pC : Then, no information sharing with the average price mitigates the externality
problem in the market of complements, as long as pS is so low that p0 and pC are far below
the joint-prot maximizing price, pm: Furthermore, average pricing softens competition in
the substitute market where each rm can extract more rents.27 On both accounts, the
rms are better o¤ without information sharing.
Of course, if we consider the other case where the full information price in the substitute
market is higher than that in the market of complements, information sharing leads to a
higher prot in the exactly opposite manner: with information sharing, rms can avoid
the aggravation of the externality problem in the complementary market and extract more
rents from the consumers who consider the goods substitutes.
Proposition 2 (Incentives to share information) If the full information price in the sub-
stitute market is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., pS < pC ; and pS is not so
low that p0 and p1 are far below the joint-prot maximizing price, pm; then rms have no
incentive to share customer information. In the other case of pC < pS ; rms can increase
their prots with information sharing.
(See Appendix for the proof.)
The above proposition tells us that the incentives to share customer information depend
crucially on the relative magnitudes of the prices that would prevail in the complementary
and substitute markets if consumers were fully segmented according to their preferences
26 If the prices for two groups are identical, i.e., pC = pS ; the issue of information sharing is no longer
interesting. Each rm has the same mark-up for both groups. The second-period prots with and without
information sharing become identical.
27For this argument, we need to assume that those who regard the two goods as substitutes have a
su¢ ciently high level of the intrinsic valuation of consumption, v: If not, the average prices, p0 and p1; that
are higher than pS , may reduce the demand in the market of substitutes to such an extent that each rm
earns less prot relative to the full information case.
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towards the product o¤erings. If the products are not perceived as highly di¤erentiated
substitutes to the extent of pS < pC ; it is indeed the uncertainty about consumerspref-
erences that makes the rms better o¤. As far as a policy implication is concerned, our
analysis shows that oligopolistic rmscommitment to not sharing customer information
possibly emphasizing privacy concerns can arise for a strategic reason. To put it dif-
ferently, we may view the commitment to not sharing information as a possible device for
tacit collusion. Another interesting implication for the policy-makers is that rms may not
always be worse o¤ even if information sharing is banned, because for the case of pS < pC
the rms will endogenously reside in the regime of no information sharing so that the reg-
ulation is not binding. Of course, in the other case of pS < pC , the prohibition of customer
information sharing will decrease the rmsprots.
5.2 The e¤ects of information sharing on consumer surplus
We nd that the e¤ects of customer information sharing on consumer surplus also depend
crucially on the relative magnitudes of the full information prices. If the full information
price in the substitute market is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., pS < pC ; the
consumers who consider the two goods complementary become beneciaries when customer
information is not shared. This is because they pay less for a pair of both goods, relative
to the full information case. In contrast, no information sharing hurts those who regard
the goods as substitutes because the average prices, p0 and p1; are higher than the full
information price, pS . For the other case of pC < pS ; those in group C prefer information
sharing while those in group S do not.
Proposition 3 (Consumer surplus) If the full information price in the substitute market
is lower than that of complementary goods, i.e., pS < pC ; customer information sharing
increases the surplus of those who regard the goods as substitutes. In contrast, the consumers
who regard the goods as complements prefer no sharing of their past transactions data. For
the other case of pC < pS ; those in group C prefer information sharing while those in group
S are better o¤ under no sharing regime.
Our analysis shows that there exist conicts of interests between di¤erent groups of
consumers. Some consumers resist customer information sharing, aside from privacy con-
cerns, due to its role in price discrimination, while others want their purchase history to be
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shared between the rms in order to receive a better deal. Therefore, we cannot say that
information sharing always makes all consumers worse o¤ or better o¤ in the presence of
uncertainty about consumerspreferences. Therefore, a ban on information sharing because
of antitrust concerns can be counterproductive.
6 More Implications and Robustness Check
6.1 More Implications of Our Research
Our innovation in this paper is to allow the possibility that product o¤erings can be ei-
ther substitutes or complements across consumers. Fortunately, this novelty also provides
interesting implications beyond the issues directly related to customer-specic information
exchange. The new insights suggested in this section are to await further research; here we
briey provide the intuitive explanations.
6.1.1 Product di¤erentiation and informational regime
The intuition for our main result provides a new perspective on the determinants of the
degree of product di¤erentiation. The standard result in the literature is that rms typically
realize higher prots from more di¤erentiated products when they compete with substitutes,
because rms can mitigate competition by di¤erentiating their product from those of their
rivals.28 When products are complementary for some consumers, however, there exists an
opposing force that potentially reduces the incentives for higher product di¤erentiation. If
the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that of the complementary
market and information sharing is prohibited, then greater product di¤erentiation aggravate
the externality problem in the complementary market because it causes the prices without
information sharing to deviate further away from the optimum. As a result, rms face a
trade-o¤ between higher prots associated with highly di¤erentiated goods in the substitute
market and the loss of prots in the complementary market from the aggravated externality
problem. This implies that the informational regime in which rms reside can inuence their
28dAspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) show this result in the Hotelling model where rms choose
their locations at two ends of a market segment, which characterizes the well-known "maximum di¤erentia-
tion" principle.
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choice of product di¤erentiation.29
6.1.2 Middlemen as information aggregators
The model in this paper analyzes direct exchange of customer information between rms
in the market. Our analysis, however, also has interesting implications for other channels
of information aggregation. For example, this paper suggests a new role for middlemen30
the intermediaries between the seller of a good and its potential buyers as information
aggregators. If the direct exchange of customer information between rms is prohibited
due to privacy concerns or antitrust regulation, the presence of middlemen, such as internet
retailers Amazon, eBay, and Google check-out, can benet rms and consumers by function-
ing as lawful institutions that facilitate information aggregation. This role of middlemen,
to our best knowledge, has not been addressed yet.
Middlemen are expected to play various roles in the markets with trade frictions and/or
imperfect information. They can lower transaction costs or serve as experts in certifying
the quality characteristics of goods.31 In addition to these traditional roles, middlemen 
especially information technology (IT)-focused, or internet-based may well be information
aggregators who are very e¢ cient in collecting, storing, and managing customer information.
6.1.3 Database co-ops and the M&A for customer information
This paper considers the situation in which consumers are heterogeneous with respect to
their relationship to product o¤erings, and the relationship the degree of complementarity
 is consumer-specic, private information unknown to rms. In such circumstances, we
have shown that each rms customer list can become more valuable to each rm when
integrated with those of other rms. In other word, the information pooling generates
informational economies of scale. This helps us to understand how customer information
can be valuable as a tradeable asset. In this aspect, our analysis provides legitimacy for
new business practices such as database co-ops. In one example, a prospective member rm
29Bester (1998) shows that consumersimperfect information about the quality of goods may reduce the
rmsincentives for product di¤erentiation. Interestingly, in our model the source of less di¤erentiation lies
in the rmsuncertainty about consumer complementarity.
30See Shevchenko (2004) for a brief literature review of recent studies on middlemen.
31See Biglaiser (1993), Biglaiser and Friedman (1994), and Li (1998) for the role of middlemen as expert
traders.
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is required to contribute at least 5000 names in order to join the Abacus 2B2 alliance.32
This paper provides an explanation for how and when the benets from such customer
information exchange can arise.
In a similar vein, our study has important implications for the merger analysis in which
the primary motive for merger is the acquisition of another rms customer lists. Even
if a merger does not lead to higher market-power or cost-synergies by eliminating some
duplications in production or marketing, it can be a protable strategy because of the value
of customer lists. In reality, we can often observe M&As arising from such a motive. The
CDNow case briey described in the Introduction is a case in point. Our study provides a
theoretical foundation for the M&A of a rm whose only asset is its customer lists in the
context of behavior-based price discrimination.33
6.2 The Robustness of the Results
As previously mentioned, sophisticated consumers who expect ex post price discrimination
may strategically misrepresent their preferences in order to increase their overall surplus,
which leads us to check the conditions under which our main results are robust with such
considerations. We also discuss the assumption that the substitute market is fully-covered
to check the robustness of our main results.
6.2.1 Potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by Group S Con-
sumers
As previously shown, if the full information price in the substitute market is higher than that
in the complementary market, i.e., pC < pS ; then each rm has ex post incentive to share
its customer purchase history with the other rms. Then, the sophisticated consumers who
consider the two goods substitutes may strategically buy both goods or neither, instead of
buying only one good, in order to avoid the expected higher second-period price pS . Needless
32For the details, see "Whos is Who among the B-to-B Co-op Databases," Catalog Age, May 1, 2004.
We borrow this real world example from Liu and Serfes (2006). For other articles about the exchange of
databases, see the followings: "List & Data Strategies: Co-ops kick it up a notch," Aug 1, 2005 and "List
and data strategies: Co-ops get down to business," Sep 1, 2005 (http://multichannelmerchant.com).
33Tadelis (1999) develops a model in which the only asset a rm has is its name. He shows that there
generates an active market for names if buyers cannot observe ownership shifts between sellers. His model
and ours have something in common in that both nd the value of intangible assets and explain their trade
between sellers.
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to say, the decision for this strategic demand manipulation hinges upon the benet-cost
analysis associated with such possible mimicries. The benet of pretending to consider the
goods complementary is a lower second-period price than the price without such a disguise,
while its cost is a potential loss of utility in the rst period.
More specically, the consumer in group S can have additional benet of (pS   pC) by
strategically purchasing either both goods or neither good instead of buying only one good.
By doing so, however, this consumer may enjoy less surplus in the rst period because she
now buys an additional good without further utility earned or loses the rst-period utility,
maxfvA; vBg  qi; that could have been earned if the consumer had not strategically chosen
no purchase. As a result, the consumer will not misrepresent her preference by buying both
goods if the rst-period price for a unit of good is su¢ ciently high due to a large marginal
cost, d. Similarly, the consumer will not engage in the misrepresentation of her preference
by opting for no purchase if the potential loss of utility in the rst period is large enough
due to a su¢ ciently high reservation value v.
6.2.2 Potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by Group C Con-
sumers
If the full information price in the substitute market is lower than that in the complementary
market, i.e., pS < pC ; the sophisticated consumers expect no information sharing in the
second period. So, they know that the second period prices will be based only on whether
they are newcomers or returning customers. In such a case, a consumers consumption
decision in group C will be based not only on the rst period surplus but also on its
subsequent e¤ect on the second period price. Specically, the consumer with  have overall
expected surplus of (   2q) + Emaxf   2p1; 0g from buying both goods in the rst
period and will then face the price for a returning consumer in the second period, while
Emaxf 2p0; 0g from not purchasing in the rst period and then receiving the newcomer
price in the second period.
With these dynamics taken into account, the rst-period price in equilibrium  and
thus the two rmsoverall prots  may di¤er from that with myopic consumers. Since
two rms post a weighted average price between pS and pC ; it is no wonder that there
exist two forces that inuence the rmsrst period prots in the opposite direction. An
increase in the rst-period price aggravates the externality problem in the complementary
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market, but allows more rent extraction from the substitute market; a decrease in the
rst-period price diminishes the externality problem, but it also reduces the rent from the
substitute market. Due to these countervailing e¤ects, we cannot unabmiguously assert
how the potential strategic misrepresentation of preferences by the consumers in group C
would a¤ect rst-period pricing and, subsequently, the rms ex ante incentive to share
customer information. We believe, however, that our qualitative results derived from ex
post perspective also extend to the case where we consider such strategic concerns, with
some restrictions on distributions, the proportion parameter, or the discount factor.
On the other hand, a consumer who considers the two goods substitutes knows that she
will face the price for a returning customer if she buys a good from the same rm, but the
price for a newcomer if she switches to the other rm in the second period. Since she is
not informed of her second-period preference, indexed by ; at the beginning of period one,
there is no dynamic e¤ect of the ex post discriminatory prices on the rst-period choice.
This is similar to the case of the changing preference in the two-period poaching model of
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
6.2.3 Not fully-covered substitute market
In our basic model, every consumer who regards the two goods as substitutes buys at
least a unit of either A or B with the assumption that the common reservation price v is
high enough to ensure that the substitute market is fully covered. Clearly, this assumption
simplies the analysis to a signicant extent because the sharing of information allows rms
to identify consumer preferences for all consumers. This assumption may sound somewhat
restrictive, but our qualitative result turns out to be robust to relaxing this assumption.
To see this point, suppose that consumers are also heterogeneous in the vertical dimen-
sion  with respect to their reservation price vi  so that the possibility of no purchase is
open to those who have relatively low reservation values for both goods. Then, even if the
rms share their customer information collected through the initial marketing period, there
will be residual uncertainty about consumer preferences. Meeting a consumer who bought
neither product, rms cannot tell if the consumer has considered the goods complementary
but did not buy either good due to a relatively low , or if the consumer has regarded
the goods as substitutes but chose not to purchase either product due to a relatively low
valuation for both goods. As a result, the rms must post a weighted average price for
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unidentied consumers even after information sharing. As far as identied consumers are
concerned, however, the incentives to share customer information work in the same manner
as in the case of perfect identication.
In fact, it must be more realistic to consider this possibility of no purchase; it only
comes at the expense of substantial complication. If our simplifying assumption is relaxed,
the demand of those who regard the goods as substitutes depends not only on horizontal,
but also vertical, dimensions. The model incorporating this feature su¤ers from technical
complexity without gaining any signicant additional insight. The benets associated with
our simple basic model outweigh its costs.
7 Concluding Remarks
We live in a world where electronic commerce through the Internet prevails more than
ever before, numerous innovations in information-technology take place rapidly, consumers
records of previous purchases can be easily traced and stored by electronic "ngerprints,"
and the issues related to privacy concerns are heard and discussed daily. Our analysis for
customer information sharing is especially relevant in such a modern business environment.
In this paper, we have investigated oligopolistic rmsincentives to share customer informa-
tion about past purchase history and the e¤ects of information sharing on consumer surplus
in a situation where rms are uncertain about whether a particular consumer regards the
product o¤erings as complements or substitutes.
The key intuition of this paper has several important implications not only for the issues
directly related to customer information sharing, but also for other signicant subjects such
as the determinants of product di¤erentiation and the roles of middlemen. Additionally,
this paper sheds a new light on merger analysis in which the primary motive for merger
is the acquisition of another rms customer lists. Our research is an early step which we
hope will encourage more research in this direction.
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Appendix
Proof of the claim: A consumer in group S (weakly) prefers buying only one product
to buying both, that is, maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg  maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB:
There are four possibilities depending on the relative magnitude of terms in the maxi-
mands. If vA  vB and vA pA  vB pB; then maxfvA; vBg = vA and maxfvA pA; vB 
pBg = vA   pA so that the given statement is shown to be true as follows.
maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg   (maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB)
= (vA   pA)  (vA   pA   pB) = pB  0
If vA  vB and vA   pA < vB   pB;then maxfvA; vBg = vA and maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg =
vB   pB:
maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg   (maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB)
= vB   pB   (vA   pA   pB) = vB   (vA   pA)  (vB   pB)  (vA   pA) > 0
If vA < vB and vA pA  vB pB; thenmaxfvA pA; vB pBg = vA pA andmaxfvA; vBg 
pA   pB = vB   pA   pB: In a similar manner, we can show that
maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg   (maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB)
= (vA   pA)  (vB   pA   pB)
= vA   (vB   pB)  0
As in the last case, if vA < vB and vA   pA < vB   pB; then we know that maxfvA  
pA; vB   pBg = vB   pB and maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB = vB   pA   pB:
maxfvA   pA; vB   pBg   (maxfvA; vBg   pA   pB)
= vB   pB   (vB   pA   pB) = pA  0
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Preliminaries for proof. Recall the rst-order conditions for pC and pS which are re-
spectively given by 
1  F (2pC)  (pC   d)f(2pC) = 0 (P1)
and
G(0)  (pS   d)g(0) = 0: (P2)
The rst-order condition for p0A; given rm Bs equilibrium prices p
0 and p1; yields
@0A
@p0A
= 0A[(1 F (p0A+p0))  (p0 d)f(p0A+p0)]+(1 0A)[G(p1 p0A)  (p0 d)g(p1 p0A)]
which, if evaluated at p0A = p0; is given by
@0A
@p0A

p0A=p
0
= 0A[(1 F (2p0)) (p0 d)f(2p0)]+(1 0A)[G(p1 p0) (p0 d)g(p1 p0)]: (P3)
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Similarly, the rst-order condition with respect to rm As price for a returning consumer,
if we evaluate at p1A = p
1; is given by
@1A
@p1A

p1A=p
1
= 1A[G(p
0 p1) (p1 d)g(p0 p1)]+(1 1A)[
 
1  F  2p1 (p1 d)f  2p1 ]:
(P4)
Note also that the MHR condition for the distribution G with its symmetry about zero
implies
d
dx

G(x)
g(x)

> 0:34 (P5)
Proof. For the equilibrium prices without sharing of customer information, p0 and p1;
to be between the two full information prices, several conditions must be satised simulta-
neously. Let us rst consider the case pC < pS : Then, for pC < p0 and pC < p1; the rst
bracketed term in (P3) and the second bracketed term in (P4) are negative due to (P1) and
@2C
@(pC)2
< 0: For p0 and p1 to be equilibrium prices, we need both @
0
A
@p0A

p0
= 0 and @
1
A
@p1A

p1
= 0;
which in turn necessiates the positive second bracketed term in (P3) and the positive rst
bracketed term in (P4). These conditions are mathematically put as:
p0 < d+
G(p1   p0)
g(p1   p0) and p
1 < d+
G(p0   p1)
g(p0   p1) : (P6)
Given the above, we need to show that both p0 and p1 are below pS ; that is, maxfp0; p1g <
pS :
If p0 < p1; the following inequalities hold:
 
pC < p0 <

p1 < d+
G(p0   p1)
g(p0   p1) < d+
G(0)
g(0)
= pS
because of (P6), (P5), and (P2), which consequently veries that the equilibrium prices
without information sharing are between the two full information prices.
For the other case of p0 < p1; we have the following result:
 
pC < p1 <

p0 < d+
G(p1   p0)
g(p1   p0) < d+
G(0)
g(0)
= pS ;
once again because of (P6), (P5) and (P2). Symmetrically, it can be shown that the
equilibrium prices without information sharing are between the two full information prices
for the other possibility of pS < pC : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the case of pS  pi  pC : The prots with and without customer information
sharing are then arranged such that i  C and i  S ; as long as pi is not extremely
low, where i = 0; 1: With the symmetry of distribution G; each rm has half of the market
of substitutes, i.e., G(b) = 1=2: The second-period prot with no information sharing is
34The similar assumption and result is also found in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000, p.637 Assumption 1 and
footnote 10).
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decomposed into
e2 = [1  F (b)]1 + F (b)0 + 1  
2
1 +
1  
2
0;
which satises the following inequality:
e2  [1  F (b)]C + F (b)C + 1  
2
S +
1  
2
S = 2:
Therefore, the prot without information sharing is at least as high as the prot with
information sharing.
For the other case of pC  pi  pS ; the relative magnitudes of prices are such that
i  C and i  S : In a similar manner, the second-period prot with no information
sharing is shown to be less than or equal to that with information sharing as follows.
e2 = [1  F (b)]1 + F (b)0 + 1  
2
1 +
1  
2
0
 [1  F (b)]C + F (b)C + 1  
2
S +
1  
2
S = 2
Q.E.D.
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